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EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-DECREASE IN MoNEY VALUE SUBSE·

AN OPTION CONTRACT Is NoT HARDsmP-ln
1940 defendant leased his property to the plaintiff for ten years with an option
to purchase for $25,000 at any time within the term of the lease. One month
before the lease expired, the plaintiff gave defendant notice of his election to
exercise the option. Defendant claimed that, subsequent to exercise of the
option, a fair bid of $35,000 had been made by a third party and, therefore,
he was not required to convey. In an action for specific performance, the
trial court held that the subsequent bid was of no effect under the contract,1
and the plaintiff was entitled to the property. On appeal from an order granting
a new trial, held, for plaintiff. In the absence of an unconscionable overreaching, the adequacy of consideration is determined at the time of the contract's
inception. Therefore, evidence of 1950 property value, the competence of the
QUENT To nm lNcEPTION OF

1 The contract in the principal case allowed the lessor-defendant to accept a bid from
a third person, only after the lessee-plaintiff refused to purchase on identical terms. The bid
made in this case, aside from being of doubtful value, followed the plaintiff's exercise of
the option and was thus ineffective. Principal case at 712.
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bid, and the depreciation of money values is immaterial. Shell Oil Co. 11. Kapler,
(Minn. 1951) 50 N.W. (2d) 707.
Equity will grant specific performance in actions on land contracts because
of the traditionally unique character of real estate, which makes remedies at
law inadequate.2 The denial of this extraordinary remedy historically lies
within the chancellor's "discretion,'' which through years of case law has
crystallized into principles to guide the court.3 Thus a long list of legal and
equitable defenses may exist at the time of the contract to serve as grounds
for denying specific performance.4 Rarely/' however, will a disparity between
price and value arising subsequent to the inception of the contract be fatal
to a plea for specific performance, unless mixed with elements of plaintiff's
fault6 or caused by unforeseen factors which, had they been contemplated by
the parties, the court assumes would have been allocated to the plaintiff's risk.7
The depreciation of money value was placed within this unforeseen factor
category by the United States Supreme Court in the famous Civil War case
of Willard 11. Tayloe. 8 In that case, although it was acknowledged that the
risk of rise in land value lay with the owner in an option contract, the court
held that the war-time issue of legal tender notes was an uncontemplated
risk from which the owner should be protected; the device employed was a
conditional decree requiring a tender of gold or silver coin by the plaintiff
seeking the land.9 The Legal Tender Decisions and the more recent Gold
Clause Decisions, which equated the classes of currency, have cut off the use
of the conditional decree as it was employed in Willard 11. Tayloe,10 but the
CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT §360 (1932).
s "The formula as to judicial discretion, therefore, is habitually used by the courts
simply to indicate that the cases before the court are governed, not by legal rules, but by
some well-established equitable principles." Bennett v. Moon, 110 Neb. 692 at 696, 194
N.W. 802 (1923).
4 PoMEROY, SPBCIFIC PERPoRMANCB oP CoNTRACTs, 2d ed., §175 (1897).
11 McLean v. Clark, 118 Misc. 284, 193 N.Y.S. 113 (1922); cf. Low v. Treadwell, 12
Me. 441 (1835).
6 Laches appears the most often in the cases, Roby v. Cossitt, 78 ill. 638 (1875); see
list of cases and annotation, 11 A.L.R. (2d) 394 (1950).
7 Owner spent 15 years in litigation protecting title, Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun
(34 N.Y.) 291 (1882); purpose of purchase prohibited by ordinance, Anderson v. Steinway
& Sorn, 178 App. Div. 507, 165 N.Y.S. 608 (1917); cf. Biggs v. Steinway & Sons, 229
N.Y. 320, 128 N.E. 2ll (1920); special assessment added to option price in a conditional
decree, King v. Raab, 123 Iowa 632, 99 N.W. 306 (1904); physical destruction of land due
to a storm, Huguenin v. Courtenay, 21 S.C. 403, 53 Am. Rep. 688 (1884).
s 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 501 (1869).
9 The operation of "Gresham's Law" had virtually driven gold and silver coin out of
circulation by 1864, Willard v. Tayloe, supra note 8, at 569.
10 Longworth v. Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334 at 343 (1875) held that the relief granted
in Willard v. Tayloe, supra note 8, was prevented by the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall.
(79 U.S.) 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871). Holder of public obligations was unable to show
damage from the withdrawal of gold coin from circulation, Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317, 55 S.Ct. 428 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432
(1935); exercise of an acknowledged governmental power is not nullified by the use of a
"gold clause" in a private contract, Norman v. B. & O. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407
(1935).
2
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underlying problems of the effect to be given depreciated money remains.11
Drastic changes in money values, when pressed by counsel, have influenced
courts in rehearing support decrees,12 in giving jury instructions in tort cases,18
and in reviewing damage assessments.14 H0wever, a fundamental division of
opinion is found in cases where the courts are required to apply foreign exchange
rates: the federal rule, by computing the exchange of foreign currency into
that of the forum at judgment day rates, adheres to the traditional currency
philosophy;15 but the ''breach day" rule, in making the computation as of the
time the cause of action arose, treats money as a mere commodity, allocating the
risks of subsequent inflation in foreign currency to the defendant. 16 Attorneys
have not been quick to utilize the ''breach day" philosophy in domestic cases, and
courts hearing specific performance cases have not distinguished inflationary
effects due to money fluctuations from those due to contemplated market factors.11
The argument that this distinction would overburden a jury is inapplicable to
a court in equity, while the practical difficulties of computation and price
index selection would likewise appear a small burden compared to many
assumed by chancellors in other cases.18 By failing to recognize drastic
fluctuations in the medium of exchange as a separate element of risk to be
allocated and by limiting Willard 11. Tayloe to cases of inflation caused by new
currency types, the court in the principal case by-passed the underlying reasoning of the Supreme Court decision. The result reached is convenient and just
on the facts, 10 for the relative value of the land in terms of the 1940 dollar
had decreased,20 leaving the disparity between price and value short of un11 Dawson and Cooper, "The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts, United States,
1861-1879," 33 MicH. L. RBv. 706 at 872 (1935); cf. McCoRMICK, DAMAcBs 198 (1935).
12 Stanley v. Stanley, 158 Fla. 402, 28 S. (2d) 694 (1947).
18 Halloran v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 A. 143 (1921); cf.
Palmer v. Security Trust, 242 Mich. 163, 218 N.W. 677 (1928).
14 Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 186 Iowa 378, 170 N.W. 461 (1919); see comment
48 CoL. L. RBv. 264 (1948).
15 "An obligation in terms of the currency of a country takes the risk of currency
fluctuations and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes no account
of it." Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517
at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926). See Rifkind, "Money As~A Device for Measuring Value,"
26 CoL. L. RBv. 559 (1926).
·
10 Justice Sutherland's dissent in Deutsche Bank Filiale Numberg v. Humphrey,
note 15 supra, at 520; Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923).
For a compromise suggestion based upon allocation of risk principles see, McCoRl'dlCK,
DAMAGBS §49 (1935).
17Martin v. Toll, 196 Iowa 388, 192 N.W. 806 (1923); cf. Daughdrill v. Edwards,
59 Ala. 424 (1877), complicated by the fact that the Confederate currency designated in
the contract had become both worthless and illegal.
18 For a continuing contract of a complex nature see, Union Pacific R. Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 16 S.Ct. 1173 (1896); see comment 5 TBX.
L. RBv. 203 (1927).
19 See note 1 supra.
20 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Business Statistics Supplement to "Survey of Current
Business" (1951), 1940 monthly all commodity indexes: wholesale 102.3, retail 99.8;
1950 monthly all commodity indexes: wholesale 49.8, retail 58.2. These figures indicate
that the 1950 dollar was 48.7% of the 1940 wholesale dollar and 58.3% of the 1940 retail
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conscionable. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the basic philosophy of Willard.
v. Tayloe should survive. Once the risk of cheapened money is isolated as a
factor, its validity as a defense should be accepted or rejected only after an
analysis of the facts before the court in light of allocation or risk principles.21

Harry T. Baumann, S.Ed.

dollar in purchasing power. To remain abreast of the money inflation the land in the principal case, valued at $25,000 in 1940, would have to increase to $51,300 (based on the
wholesale index) or $42,900 (based on the retail index), both of which are in excess of the
$35,000 bid claimed by the defendant.
21 Support for these arguments may be found in, Dawson and Cooper, "The Effect of
Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879," 33 MICH. L. REv 706 at 912
(1935); 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §§927-954 (1936).

